Governance Proposal - Amendment to GP‑#3: Governor Revenue Share (by TINY Power) + Continued Buyback‑and‑Burn, with a User‑Selectable USDC or Auto‑Compound to Locked TINY Claim Option

Governance Proposals
1

[Governance Proposal — Amendment to GP#3] Governor Revenue Share (by TINY Power) + Continued Buyback‑and‑Burn, with a User‑Selectable USDC or Auto‑Compound to Locked TINY Claim Option

Category: Governance Proposals
Related: Governance Proposal #3 — Implementing a Buyback and Burn Program for TINY

Abstract

This proposal amends Governance Proposal #3 (Dec 2024) by splitting the already‑approved 20% allocation of the protocol’s fee share (i.e., 20% of the 0.05% protocol/treasury fee) into two streams:

  • 10% → Governor Revenue Share (GRS), distributed pro‑rata by TINY Power to eligible governors and claimable via a user‑level toggle:
    1. Claim in USDC, or
    2. Auto‑compound by converting to TINY and locking it for the same remaining duration as the governor’s current lock (atomic with the claim).
  • 10% → Buyback‑and‑Burn (BBB) — continuing the Governance Proposal #3 burn mechanism with half of the original allocation.

This amendment does not change the 0.3% total swap fee, does not affect LP rewards, and preserves the Treasury’s existing 80% share of the protocol fee portion.

Objective

  1. Modify Governance Proposal #3’s internal allocation (keeping its total at 20% of the protocol fee share) to:
    10% GRS (governors, pro‑rata by TINY Power) + 10% BBB (unchanged mechanics).
  2. Provide two claim options to every eligible governor:
    • USDC claim, or
    • Auto‑compound → convert to TINY and lock for the same remaining duration as the governor’s current lock.
  3. Do not change: total fee 0.3%, LP share 0.25%, protocol share 0.05%, or LP incentives.

Background

What Governance Proposal #3 established (Dec 2024)

The community approved allocating 20% of Tinyman’s protocol fee share (0.05%) to buy back TINY and burn it, with the remaining 80% retained by the Treasury; LPs’ 0.25% share remained unaffected.

Current fee breakdown (unchanged by this amendment)

As clarified by the Tinyman team:

“A fee of 0.3% is added to all swaps.
5/6ths of this fee (0.25%) is paid to Poolers (LPs).
1/6th of this fee (0.05%) is paid to the protocol (Tinyman Treasury).”
— EricTinyman (Dec 2024)

This proposal does not change that structure; it only splits the already‑approved 20% of the protocol share between GRS and BBB.

Community discussion prompted this amendment

Someone asked:

“What if a portion of the fees collected from all activity was paid to all governors based on their percentage, but not in Tiny? Or what if it was paid in Tiny but also auto locked?”

Response (idea refined into this amendment):

Distributing a small portion of protocol revenue to governors pro‑rata by TINY Power, with an option to auto‑compound into locked TINY, would increase ongoing demand, lengthen commitments as TINY Power decays, and maintain a steady burn — improving alignment without changing LP rewards or total fee levels.

Details

1) Modification of Governance Proposal #3 Allocation (within the same 20%)

  • Governor Revenue Share (GRS): 10% of the protocol’s 0.05% fee share.
  • Buyback‑and‑Burn (BBB): 10% of the protocol’s 0.05% fee share (continues Governance Proposal #3 burn mechanics).
  • Treasury retain: 80% of the protocol fee share (unchanged).
  • LPs: continue to receive 0.25% of swap volume, unchanged.

This is strictly a re‑allocation inside the previously approved 20% from Governance Proposal #3; the total authorization remains unchanged.

2) Governor Revenue Share (GRS) — Mechanics

  • Eligibility & Weighting: Rewards are assigned pro‑rata by TINY Power (amount × remaining lock duration), using multi‑point daily snapshots aggregated over a 7‑day epoch to mitigate last‑minute timing games.
  • Asset Handling: Protocol fees forwarded to the collector are routed and consolidated as needed by the distributor.

User‑Level Claim Options:

  1. Claim in USDC

    • The distributor converts claimable amounts to USDC and disburses USDC to the claimant.

  2. Auto‑Compound to TINY (same‑duration auto‑lock)

    • The distributor converts the claimant’s allocation to TINY via on‑protocol routing; the claim transaction group includes an atomic call that locks the purchased TINY in the Governance Vault for the same remaining duration as the claimant’s current lock.
    • The claim succeeds only if the auto‑lock step succeeds in the same atomic group.

Rationale: Option (2) adds buy pressure to TINY and increases the locked supply over time, reinforcing governance alignment and scarcity. Option (1) offers straightforward utility for governors who prefer USDC.

3) Buyback‑and‑Burn (BBB) — Continued

  • Mechanics unchanged from Governance Proposal #3, funded at 10% of the protocol fee share after this amendment.
  • Executes time‑sliced (TWAP‑like) TINY purchases and burns to a verifiably unrecoverable address.
  • Maintains periodic transparency (purchased amounts, burn txids).

4) Contracts & Roles (no pool‑level changes)

  • RevenueSplitter (new): Set as the protocol fee_collector; forwards 80% → Treasury, 10% → GRS Distributor, 10% → BBB.
  • GRS Distributor (new): Maintains epoch bookkeeping and TINY Power snapshots; performs conversions; exposes:
    • claimUSDC() — disburse USDC;
    • claimAndAutoLock() — convert to TINY and atomically lock for the same remaining duration.
  • BBB (existing): Executes buy & burn with on‑chain event reporting.
  • Governance Vault (existing): Unchanged; lock semantics and TINY Power apply as documented.

5) Numerical Illustration (using Governance Proposal #3’s example volumes)

  • Daily volume: $10,000,000 → protocol fee share 0.05% = $5,000/day.
  • Approved 20% (unchanged total) → $1,000/day now splits to:
    • GRS: $500/day (governors pro‑rata by TINY Power; claimant chooses USDC or auto‑compound to locked TINY).
    • BBB: $500/day (buy & burn as in Governance Proposal #3).
  • LPs: still receive 0.25% (unchanged).

Expected Outcomes

  • Direct alignment with commitment: Governors accrue ongoing Governor Revenue Share weighted by TINY Power, which favors higher volume and longer‑duration locking.
  • Demand & locked supply: Auto‑compound option increases buy pressure and locked TINY, reinforcing governance and scarcity.
  • Deflation preserved: BBB continues to remove supply with clear reporting.
  • Treasury stability: Treasury continues to receive 80% of the protocol fee share.

Implementation Timeline

  • Phase 0 — Spec Finalization (≤ 2 weeks post‑approval): Freeze ABIs, epoch cadence, snapshot schedule; finalize UI/UX for the claim toggle and atomic group flow.
  • Phase 1 — Development & Integration (3–4 weeks):
    • Deploy RevenueSplitter (as fee_collector),
    • Deploy GRS Distributor,
    • Integrate front‑end claim toggle (USDC vs Auto‑Compound),
    • Ensure atomic group composition for claimAndAutoLock().
  • Phase 2 — Audit & Remediation (2–3 weeks): Third‑party or community security review; publish report; address findings.
  • Phase 3 — Mainnet Launch: Activate the splitter and begin GRS + BBB flows; publish a first‑month transparency report (allocations, claims, burns).

Challenges and Considerations

  • Regulatory treatment: Maintain an opt‑in, claim‑based design; no equity‑like rights are conveyed.
  • Snapshot fairness: Use multi‑point daily snapshots aggregated to the epoch to reduce timing games.
  • Market impact (BBB): Execute time‑sliced purchases to minimize slippage and signaling effects.
  • Operational safety: Leverage existing roles and fee‑collection pathways; no pool‑contract changes required.

Benefits

  • Pro‑rata by TINY Power: Rewards align with stake × time commitment.
  • Dual payout flexibility: USDC for utility; Auto‑Compound to strengthen TINY demand and locked supply.
  • Sustained burn: BBB preserves a clear, mechanical deflationary vector.
  • Unchanged LP incentives & fees: LPs’ 0.25% and total fee 0.3% remain intact; the Treasury’s 80% of protocol fees remains intact.

Metrics for Success

  1. Aggregate TINY Power and median lock duration (levels and trends).
  2. GRS participation: unique claimants/epoch; claim rate; USDC vs Auto‑Compound split.
  3. Burn cadence: TINY purchased and burned per epoch; cumulative burned (txids).
  4. Treasury health: net protocol inflows post‑split; operating runway indicators.
  5. Market quality: liquidity depth and slippage on TINY pairs.

Additional Information

Poll

Approve this amendment to Governance Proposal #3 to split the previously approved 20% protocol‑fee allocation into 10% Governor Revenue Share (pro‑rata by TINY Power) and 10% Buyback‑and‑Burn, and to offer every governor two claim options at payout time (USDC or Auto‑Compound to TINY with same‑duration auto‑lock)?

  • YES — Approve the amendment (enable GRS with both claim options) and continue BBB at 10%.
  • NO — Keep Governance Proposal #3 unchanged (100% of the 20% allocation to BBB only).
0 voters

The poll will remain open for at least 48 hours per Tinyman governance guidelines.

5 Likes
2

Feels like you made this proposal way more complicated than it has to be. Why not just propose to split current 20% burn allocation into half –> 10% burn & 10% goes as extra into weekly governance rewards. Basically you achieve same thing without any dev work. if people want to compound, they will lock their TINY rewards. if they want cash, they sell their weekly TINY rewards.
So keep it simple.

Regards,
ROAM

1 Like
3

I will clarify my previous comment if it was not clear for someone why end result will be the same.

Current 20% Buy Back & Burn:

  • Tinyman uses 20% of their fees to buy back TINY from the market and then burns those TINY tokens
    (Impact: buy pressure + deflation)

Proposal:

  • Tinyman uses 10% of their fees to buy TINY from the market and then burns those TINY tokens
    (Impact: buy pressure + deflation)

  • Offer 2 options for 10% fees:
    –> Claim USDC (impact: neutral)
    –> “auto-compound”, buy TINY from the market and lock into governance (Impact: buy pressure + locked TINY)

Compared to pure BBB play, in worst case TINY buy pressure will be cut in half. also slightly lowered trading volume in TINY pools (USDC claim part).

Keep it simple solution compared to proposal:

  • Tinyman uses 10% of their fees to buy TINY from the market and then burns those TINY tokens
    (Impact: buy pressure + deflation) - No difference compared to proposal.

  • Tinyman uses 10% of their fees to buy TINY from the market and then adds them into weekly governance rewards. (impact: buy pressure)
    in this model, people will get those added TINY proportionally to their TINY power, so they have still same incentive to lock those TINY back into governance as have in proposal. so no difference compared to proposal from incentive point of view.
    What if they want USDC? –> people can sell that part of TINY rewards when they claim weekly governance rewards, but that generates more fees into TINY pools and also increases trading volume. – Compared to proposal, this way people have to use pools more and initial buy pressure is already in there. So if people choose to sell their TINY, price impact is ±0, because those TINY tokens were bought from the market first. So TINY price point of view price impact is neutral, but increases pool usage –> more fees and trading volume.

Summa summarum:
There are no reason to create this new model that requires dev hours. By allocating 10% into weekly rewards, we achieve same end result.

My personal opinion: I think current buy back & burn model is the best way to fight against current inflation and in some way guarantees positive underlying long-term price action.
This kind of 10% & 10% solution is more relevant when current governance reward runway is running out.

Regards,
ROAM

1 Like
4

Thank you @ROAM you for the thoughtful response.

The required template for submitting a proposal makes this sound more complicated than it is. The TLDR:

  • Current system: 20% of fees are used to buy TINY and then burn that permanently.
  • New proposal: 10% of fees are used to buy TINY and then burn that permanently, the other 10% are used to purchase and distribute USDC, or used to purchase TINY and then lock that TINY for the same duration of the governors already locked TINY, which is very similar in outcome to burning but provides more direct value for the TINY holder. It also provides an auto-compounding mechanism, a often requested feature.

This proposal is very purposefully meant to be Different than the existing TINY rewards system. This is meant to be a New incentive to buy and lock TINY as the existing system contributes to constant unremitting selling pressure daily and weekly as many users sell their rewards distributed in TINY. The proposal encourages more locking of TINY over time than the current system does. Swap fees are not collected in TINY and claiming in USDC does not cause TINY sell pressure. If a user claims in TINY, it automatically locks in governance as an auto-compounding feature, rather than allowing the user to sell the TINY.

In more detail:

1) Different source of value, different behavioral outcome

  • Fees are not collected in TINY. Protocol fees accrue in the assets being traded (i.e., input/sell asset), and pools forward accrued fees (in both assets) to a configurable fee_collector. That’s the basis for routing fees to a splitter/distributor. (docs.tinyman.org)

  • GP#3 currently allocates 20% of the protocol’s 0.05% fee share to buy TINY and burn it; LPs’ 0.25% is untouched. Our amendment keeps the fee structure intact, but splits that same 20% into 10% burn + 10% to governors. (Tinyman Governance Forum)

Your “keep it simple” variant (“10% burn + 10% buy TINY and add to weekly TINY rewards”) re-enters the reward stream as liquid TINY, which is functionally a new emission channel. Many users who want other ASAs or USDC will sell those TINY rewards each week, continuing the structural sell pressure that GP#3 was created to counter. In contrast, our design lets governors choose:

  1. Claim in USDC (no sell pressure on TINY, immediate utility), or

  2. Auto‑compound: convert their share into TINY and lock it atomically for the same remaining duration as their current governance lock (increasing locked supply; cannot be immediately sold). Lock semantics (no withdrawal during lock) are documented in the Governance Vault. (docs.tinyman.org)

This is not “the same incentive.” With weekly TINY rewards, users who prefer stables or other ASAs must sell TINY to get them. With USDC claim, the users receive a stable value without any TINY sell pressure. And with auto‑compound, they increase locked TINY in the same atomic group as the claim—no interim window to sell.

2) “End result is the same” — it is not (microstructure & net‑flow math)

Let’s compare net buy/sell pressure using GP#3’s own volume example:

  • Daily volume $10M → protocol share 0.05% = $5,000/day.

  • GP‑#3 allocation 20% → $1,000/day. (Tinyman Governance Forum)

Now compare three cases:

A) GP#3 (baseline today)

  • $1,000/day buy & burn → $1,000/day buy pressure, $0 sell.

B) “Simple” variant (your suggestion)

  • $500/day burn (buy $500 → burn).

  • $500/day buy TINY → distribute as liquid TINY rewards.

    • If β is the fraction recipients sell on claim, sell pressure = β·$500/day.

    • Net = $500 (burn buy) + $500 (reward buy) − β·$500 = $1,000 − $500β.

C) Proposed amendment (USDC or auto‑compound)

  • $500/day burn (buy $500 → burn).

  • $500/day to governors with choice:

    • α = fraction choosing auto‑compound → buy = α·$500/day; sell = 0 (locked).

    • (1−α) = fraction choosing USDC → buy = 0, sell = 0 (neutral to TINY).

    • Net = $500 (burn buy) + α·$500.

When is (C) superior to (B)?

(C) − (B)=500(α+β−1).

If α + β > 1, the amendment has higher net buy (and lower sell). In practice, weekly liquid TINY rewards often see meaningful sell‑through (β well above 0.5), while a solid cohort will auto‑compound (α > 0). Under those conditions, (C) dominates — less structural sell pressure and more TINY locked over time.

Even when α is moderate (say α=0.4) and β is typical for weekly emissions (β≈0.7),

  • (B) net = $1,000 − 0.7·$500 = $650/day,

  • (C) net = $500 + 0.4·$500 = $700/day, with zero incremental sell.

Our design trades some immediate headline “buy” for a significant reduction in automatic weekly sell pressure and a mechanical increase in locked supply.

3) “But this reduces TINY pool volume” — by design, and that is OK

  • USDC claims are intentionally price‑neutral for TINY. They deliver simple, stable value users understand, and do not force TINY sells to realize that value. The reduction in churn (weekly claim‑and‑dump behavior) is more beneficial to price quality than the incremental “volume” created by selling reward TINY for stables.

  • Auto‑compound creates recurring buy‑and‑lock flows that raise the locked ratio and lower free float—an effect closer to burn in the short/medium term, while keeping a pathway for future governance alignment. This provides more Direct value to holders.

  • The fee structure and LP economics do not change: 0.3% total fee; 0.25% to LPs; 0.05% to protocol. This amendment only splits the already‑approved 20% of the protocol share (GP#3) between burn and governor share. (Tinyman Governance Forum)

Volume that comes from forced reward sells is low‑quality order‑flow for a governance token. We’re optimizing for healthier supply dynamics and stickier governance, not raw volume.

4) “No dev work” vs “bounded, worthwhile dev work”

  • Tinyman’s protocol already supports fee forwarding to a fee_collector and public fee claim mechanics. Directing that into a splitter + distributor (with a claim toggle) is incremental and bounded work rather than a ground‑up redesign. The value of removing structural sell pressure and adding an auto‑lock path justifies this scope. (docs.tinyman.org)

5) Why this is purposefully different from existing rewards

  • Existing governance rewards are TINY‑denominated (a planned multi‑year emission curve) and can be sold freely at claim—this is the sell‑pressure GP#3 sought to offset. (docs.tinyman.org)

  • The new stream is fee‑funded, choice‑based, and either neutral (USDC) or supply‑tightening (auto‑locked TINY) at the moment of claiming. That’s the point: a new incentive and a new path to accumulate locked TINY without increasing liquid TINY handouts.

TL;DR

  • Not the same outcome. Paying governors from fees with a USDC or auto‑lock TINY toggle cuts routine sell pressure that comes from TINY‑denominated distributions.

  • Users who want stables can take USDC without selling TINY; users who want to accumulate can auto‑compound into locked TINY atomically.

  • We keep burn (10%) and keep fees & LPs unchanged, while adding a persistent mechanism to grow locked supply and improve price quality over time. (Tinyman Governance Forum, docs.tinyman.org)

Bottom line, this proposal gives TINY governors more direct value, reduces TINY selling pressure, and encourages regular ongoing locking of TINY to maintain these rewards, which is different than distributing additional liquid TINY users can immediately sell.

1 Like
5

What about instead of offering part of the rewards in USDC via Tiny, the rewards could be offered via claiming Tiny/USDC LP rather than offering a tiny and USDC split?

The initial sell pressure would be upfront from the buying up significan LP to offer in rewards, but would also net fees from holding the USDC/tiny LP while it sat waiting for weekly claiming (Correct or am I mistaken?).

It (may) also encourage simply locking the LP into farms rather than doing the additional work of swaping the entire thing to USDC come rewards claiming time from a governance user perspective.

PACT offers a similar bonus with some of it’s pools, offering algo/pow LPs as rewards in additional to the POW token.

6

“Your “keep it simple” variant (“10% burn + 10% buy TINY and add to weekly TINY rewards”) re-enters the reward stream as liquid TINY” → which is same as taking all in USDC in your model.
In my keep it simple model all TINY has to be bought first, so max “sell pressure” is basically ±0. not negative. only difference is that in my model no need to create separate mechanism for direct USDC claim. you can’t sell more than you bought.

Your model assumes that somehow people in simple model are willing to sell more, which I think is logical error. main driver for poor level of new locks, is the fact that there are yield farmers and has always been. Tinyman is no different, this is general phenomenon. The other fact is that some sell because VCs will dump, so they want to dump first when token still has more value.

Like I said, in both cases if people want to sell, the end result is the same.
Simple model: sell bought tiny (impact ±0) and weekly new emission tiny rewards = net new tiny emission sold.
In your model: take USDC + sell new weekly tiny emission = net new tiny emission sold.
So end result is the same.

What if they reinvest all?
In simple model: lock bought TINY (protocol level purchase) + weekly new emission tiny rewards = all locked
In your model: lock bought TINY (user level purchase)+ weekly new emission tiny rewards = all locked
So the end result is the same.

Assuming that somehow people will behave so differently just because lock or sell is done via different button is ridiculous in my opinion. and I can argue that if TINY tokens are already bought to user and they simple have to reinvest, they are more likely to do so. if they see USDC, they are more likely to take it and use it for something else.

Sorry, but still I think this is just extra work and bureaucracy. and now when I think, maybe even tempting for users to allocate funds into something else when USDC directly in front of them.

I think real question is, can allocating funds for users lead into higher participation than buyback & burn program? I think answer is “NO”. Robust buyback and burn guarantees that there is constantly underlying buy pressure driving price higher, no matter what the general market mood is. if some of funds are allocated to users, it is guaranteed that some of those newly allocated funds will not end up into TINY and into Governance lock.
So BBB guarantees 100% buyback & burn (permalock) vs redistributed funds that are less than 100%. → lower buy pressure leads into weaker price performance? → probably.

Regards,
ROAM

1 Like
7

You have valid comments and I understand your perspective. However, the reason many users have asked for this proposal is they want something different than the current system. I think the proposal gives TINY a new perceived “utility” without costing TM any money, and with a similar effect (and likely better) on the price dynamics than just burning 20% of swap fees.

The concept is to do something different than just burning the TINY or giving more TINY for people to sell. The current system is not optimal; we have seen an ongoing decline in TINY value over time as users claim rewards from farming and governance, and the recent increase in TINY locking has been partially due to the NFT locking campaign. The goal of this proposal is to improve the inherent value of TINY and encourage users to lock more of their TINY over time.

With the proposal, TINY governors would get USDC, OR would get TINY which is automatically locked for the same duration as their already locked TINY (auto-compounding).
Current system: 20% of fees are used to buy TINY and then burn that permanently.
New proposal: 10% of fees are used to buy TINY and then burn that permanently, the other 10% are used to purchase and distribute USDC, or used to purchase TINY and then lock that TINY for the same duration of the governors already locked TINY, which is very similar in outcome to burning but provides more direct value for the TINY holder.

My proposal gives TINY governors more direct, tangible, and visible value (USDC) than just burning (reduced supply is not as perceptible), reduces TINY selling pressure (as opposed to distributing more TINY to just be sold immediately), and encourages regular ongoing locking of TINY to maintain these rewards (USDC rewards are tied to TINY power, not TINY holding, so the user needs to lock more with time to maintain the same rewards), which is all different than distributing additional liquid TINY users can immediately sell. While you are correct that it is technically not as consistent of an impact as directly burning all 20% every time, this proposed system will likely increase demand for TINY and desire to lock more TINY as it directly rewards holders in a more tangible way rather than a harder to see supply reduction.

The recent extreme market response to ALPHA and HAY as direct revenue-sharing models is helpful to frame this proposal’s potential impact on TINY.

8

That’s an interesting concept, but it would add a layer of complexity to the system and would not provide the same benefits as outlined above.

The swap fees are not collected in TINY, so the conversion step to USDC vs TINY is essentially the same, but adding to a LP would be an additional step, though trivial with how easy it is to compose atomic groups.
If the 10% distribution were added to a USDC/TINY LP instead of USDC or auto-compounded locked TINY, they would not be accumulating LP fees while waiting for the governor to claim the rewards because the rewards will only be distributed once per week.

Rewards are assigned pro‑rata by TINY Power (amount × remaining lock duration), using multi‑point daily snapshots aggregated over a 7‑day epoch to mitigate last‑minute timing games.

While the concept of adding to a LP is interesting, it would not meet the goal of this proposal to improve the inherent value of TINY and encourage users to lock more of their TINY over time.

1 Like
9

I would get that if TINY token is in more matured phase and worst inflation is over. and also if Tinyman would be bigger than it currently is.

I run some numbers to see if we can kind of approach this USDC distribution from dividend point of view (ALPHA token playbook).

Three different scenarios: (label)

  • Current Tinyman 24h trading volume: $400k (Current)
  • Assume average trading volume is: $600k (Average)
  • Optimistic view: $1M (Optimistic)

Daily fees to allocate:
Trading volume x Tinyman cut (0.05%) x 20% allocation divided by 2 to get 10% share:

  • Current: $400k x 0.0005 = $200 * 0.2 = $40 / 2 = $20
  • Average: $600k x 0.0005 = $300 * 0.2 = $60 / 2 = $30
  • Optimistic: $1M x 0.0005 = $500 * 0.2 = $100 / 2 = $50

So daily rewards allocated into possible USDC distributions are $20, $30 & $50.
Then we have to check how much that is per week:

  • Current: $20 x 7 = $140
  • Average: $30 x 7 = $210
  • Optimistic: $50 x 7 = $350

How much is that per governor per week? took some figures from portal:
Spot on governor list : tiny power weight = USDC figures per current, average & optimistic:
No 1 : 9.19% = $12.866 , $19.299 & 32.165
No 10 : 1.89% = $2.646 , $3.969 & $6.615
No 50 : 0.38% = $0.532 , $0.798 & $1.33
No 100 : 0.14% = $0.196 , $0.294 & $0.49
No 250 : 0.037% = $0.0518 , $0.0777 & $0.1295
No 500 : 0.012% = $0.0168 , $0.0252 & $0.042
No 1000 : 0.0039% = $0.00546 , $0.00819 & $0.01365
No 2000 : 0.0006% = $0.00084 , $0.00126 & $0.0021

Are those figures reasonable? I think there is no right or wrong answers, just opinions.
Personally I think it is too early to distribute protocol rewards and focus should be on fight against inflation. That is just me so I will vote against this proposal. but if people think these kind of USDC drops are what they want, then so be it. After all I have only my vote :laughing:

But good to think also absolute numbers and if those make sense.

Regards,
ROAM

4 Likes
10

That breakdown of numbers looks much smaller than we would hope to see moving forward. The “optimistic” 1M in daily trading volume is closer to the regular daily trading volume more recently per DefiLlama:
https://defillama.com/protocol/dexs/tinyman

Past performance does not predict future results, but September has historically been a very poor month for markets in general over the past decade, including for trading volume on TM during the time it has existed. At the time the original GP#3 was written in December of last year, the daily average trading volume really was 10M per day.

The users who are locking TINY for extended periods are making a bet on the future growth of the Tinyman platform and on Algorand in general. The purpose of this proposal is to help improve the inherent value of TINY and encourage users to lock more of their TINY over time. The further downstream effect of having a revenue-sharing distribution in a tangible easy to understand asset like USDC is excitement about future increased trading volume, which helps promote organic marketing for the platform; this is how HAY is building hype as they launch their new product.

Likely all of us in this forum hope the daily trading volume of Tinyman increases over time. :slight_smile:

4 Likes
11

great points. this has my full support. I am excited to see this pass.

2 Likes
12

When will be the on chain voting?

2 Likes
13

From the Governance Process Guideline we need 50 votes total to move to a formal on-chain vote:

We’re at 24 votes total right now, with a pretty strong interest with a YES vote 22 to 2. If you know other TINY holders and TINY governors who would find this proposal interesting, please share it and ask them to comment and vote. We’re half way there.

3 Likes
14

That is a fair enough point :slight_smile:

1 Like
15

Hi @orad.algo Thanks a lot for sharing this thoughtful and well-articulated proposal!

We discussed this internally and really appreciate the creativity and clarity in the design.

At this point, we are currently focused on a number of upcoming features that we believe will deliver more immediate value to the protocol and its users. However, we definitely see the potential of this idea as a longer-term governance enhancement - especially once trading volumes pick up again.

We will keep this proposal in mind and may revisit it as the ecosystem evolves. In the meantime, please stay tuned. We will be sharing more updates soon about what’s coming next.

4 Likes
16

Sounds like a very well thought out change!

I’m all for it! This is a great proposal!

1 Like
17

@orad.algo

Remove the option to “Claim USDC”. It is unnecessary and adds unneeded complication. Users can already swap their weekly claimed Tiny tokens for whatever token they want. Also, what if I don’t want USDC? I’d have to swap it out again.